
Is Metaphysics Essential to Science and Common-Sense?

Seria a Metafísica Essencial à Ciência e ao Senso Comum?

Abstract: One of statements more consensual of the History of Philosophy is that says that the Metaphysics is not science, but is thought. This paper will goes defend the thesis that the Metaphysics is condition for the common sense and the science. First, it is showed that the terms which we use daily reflect a *world-picture* and that the universals are indispensable to this *world-picture*. When we think and do previsions, do spontaneous uses of terms with universal meaning. After, it is showed that the science naturally does uses of terms with universal meaning when it does previsions. Lastly, will be aims that the Metaphysics is prior to our hypothesis and speculations.

Keywords: Thought; Philosophy of Language; Metaphysics; World-Picture; Science.

Resumo: Uma das declarações mais consensuais da História da Filosofia é a que diz que a Metafísica não é ciência, mas pensamento. Neste artigo, procurar-se-á defender a tese que a Metafísica é condição para o senso comum e a ciência. Primeiro, é mostrado que os termos ao qual nós utilizamos diariamente refletem nossa imagem de mundo. Quando pensamos e fazemos previsões, fazemos o uso espontâneo de termos com significado universal. Depois, é procurado evidenciar que a ciência naturalmente faz uso de termos com significado universal quando faz previsões. Finalmente, buscará apresentar que a Metafísica é anterior às nossas hipóteses e especulações.

Palavras-Chave: Pensamento; Filosofia da Linguagem; Metafísica; Imagem do Mundo; Ciência.

Introduction

In this present paper will be defended the thesis that the Metaphysics is essential condition of the common sense – because is shared a *world-picture*, and also is indispensable condition for science in general. When the people think

daily worldly relationship or the scientist formulate a hypothesis start of the conceptual aspect, this is a demonstration of the moving of the thought. For this is necessary a *world-picture* shared, terms which has broad *extension* and shared meaning. Otherwise, could we formulate a hypothesis how do we will do as following? Have an example: “All brazilians cats that have blue eyes are deaf.”¹ Is said by a symbolization for avoid the ambiguity inherent to verbal language.

$$a) \forall x (Gx \cdot Bx) \rightarrow Sx)$$

Indeed, in the affirmative is necessary to share a *world-picture* - prior to research which cause the deafness, and, also, are inside of the *extension* of the concept of cats which the *intension* is: “are Brazilians, have blues eyes and are deaf”. This conception is prior to science research and refers to Thought strictly, “conditioning the scientific observation.”² The foresight of common-sense also has as starting point a *world-picture* shared and, consequently, the use of terms with universal meaning, which we will see in further examples.³

We will still be argued that an universal – as classically understood - relates to Thought and is indispensable for to understand the world, “the prediction of facts and behaviors in general”. Thus, it is will point out which the function that an universal has in language, appearing expressed by terms with determined *extension*, i.e., is expressed by terms that “are predicates of many.” So that to justify the statement that Thought is property of many and it has relative “symmetry” toward language, will be argue that owing to language reasonably “reflect” the Thought, all and any language as well as any logical

¹ Nobody asks about the meaning of “cats” or “Brazilian.” There are a presupposition of meaning and existence for to do the hypothesis.

²The world-picture which Wittgenstein speaks is linked to education. For Wittgenstein, for example, when is spoken “Brasília is capital of Brazil”, we can to fill with the object “Brasília” only because we learned Geography at school. That *world-picture* represents a structured and primitive set of concepts. It represents, moreover, a image beyond of justification and doubt. Our reflection, also, depend that world-picture, because, is the condition for reflection and the act of doubt about anything.

³ The use of “universal meaning” concerns to conception that a word means an predicate universalized in all things or individuals of a same class and, this universal has as meaning a concept which can to be translated in others language. Thus, “white”, “branco”, “blanco”, “blanc”, can to be translate; they have a “universal meaning”. We can to refer this theory to Aristotle and D. M. Armstrong. Cf. AUNE, Bruce .2002. Of course, in this paper is used “meaning universal” as a creation own.

system, belongs to language in a more general sphere as structured assemblage and public of meanings and the universal is a way of to share thought.

It is very important that reader consider to scheme of this paper. It begins discussing the intimate relation that there are between language and thought, evidencing that there are a sensible aspect of thought expressed by language and an aspect non- sensible which is thought purely. It does use of word “term” meaning the sensible aspect of concept, because it is used of different manner to way of modern logic which uses the meaning as “almost-name”. It is use almost that strictly the word *extension* with the meaning of classes (to Carnap’s way) applying to predicates and uses *intension* in this paper basically for distinguish the properties of the meaning to a predicate.

After, it is indicated the function of the concepts and as the concepts with broad extension are part of Thought, meaning the universal. Moreover, it is appointed as the concepts are implicated by shared world-picture, because, to share a language is to share a *world-picture* and, consequently, a view of world. The concepts are implicated by thought as property of many that show it in *world-picture*.

1. The Metaphysics is thought

Among the more consensual statements of History of Philosophy is the Kant’s statement that the Metaphysics belongs to Thought; however, it is impossible as science. The metaphysical impossibility is founded on fact of to be merely an outspread of *a priori* concepts that go beyond of experience.

Notwithstanding, big progress were done still that after of “language turn” and of the critical done by logical empiricism of Vienna Circle. Thus, considering the strong preoccupation with language and its analysis, one of methods that can be considered serious in Metaphysics, should naturally consider that. Indeed, as indicated by Donald Davidson, when we share a language, necessarily we share a *world-picture* and that, moreover, follows that when become manifest more general characteristics of language, become manifests the features more general of this reality.

Through of the term “clear logically the language” something that we do through the logic analysis of proposition, we clear, necessarily, the thought; i.e., the clarification of the Thought occurs by language. Wittgenstein in your *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* linked Thought to language, because – tells Wittgenstein - the proposition is the sensible aspect of the thought.

Indeed, if there are a concordance as research method in Metaphysics is that language is one of main tools of study. Therefore, we need consider that the resolution of classic problems in Metaphysics pass by analysis of language; different philosophers used this method and so, through analysis of language, that will be launched a “new approaches” to the problem of universals at mode that this classic problem was formulated, showing, however, a new way for its usage. To resolve or to aim a direction to problem of universals, consequently to assert that Metaphysics is possible or not, because certainly nothing better characterizes the Metaphysics that this problem; the problem of the universals is more or less measured through the problem about structure of world and different functions of language that “touch directly that world“. To think about universals and to aim a solution are in last measure to aim the impossibility or not of the Metaphysics.

Through of the general terms and its relation in the proposition with concepts with broad *extension, falling various entities under them*, these terms have a function of meaning universal. If there are a fact who we have to forward is about the existence or non-existence of universals and that the own thought only is possible by universals. They are parts which form the Thought. The universal enables us to think the world and theorize it. Our language, consequently, has a feature functional. It is understood functionality as relationship among the words of the discourse, building, then, an idea of reality or enabling us to think about world. A function, a relationship among words, cans “project us” to future or to past. A term with broad *extension*, which has among the functions to be the *significant* of a universal concept – i.e., the *significata* of the term - only makes that because, is in a relationship with others words. According with the relationship among words, determined conception of world will result this relationship. We can to have two examples:


- 1) The dinosaurs became extinct million of years ago.
- 2) In the Future the cats will continue carnivores.

Of course, it is necessary to learn at school about what means the word “dinosaurs”. We share a concept that, together with the “*object*” outcome of in a *world-picture*. For this reason, for to affirm about past, is necessary to presuppose that we speak of the object; we have that to presuppose that our words “the dinosaurs” tell us about the qualities of the dinosaurs; that the general qualities of dinosaurs someway coincide in all individuals of class.

In 1) the concept of dinosaurs that it is learned at school – although belongs to *world-picture*, it is necessary to be more or less true for to have any conclusion from its.⁴

In 2), there are an assertion about the future; an aspect of reality that will be. It is as whether the concepts were beyond space and time, independents of subjects, having, then, the thought as wires of the *world-picture*. Only by thought we “touch” the *world-picture*; i.e., can to think because there are a *world-picture* that is outcome of concepts with the *world-picture*. It is possible, then, to make a schema:

Schema 01:



⁴ Donald Davidson tell us in your essay “The Method of Truth in Metaphysics”, that “I can to believe that a cloud pass against of sol, but only I because that exists a sun, that the cloud are made of steam, that the water can exists in liquid form.” (DAVIDSON, D. 1990.). Indeed, we have as *condition sine qua non* of to speak about the world a set of shared beliefs which the language is the principal “vehicle” of the beliefs and concepts about the world.

2. The function of the Concepts

A Concept, according Frege, is thought of the way different than did thought by previous philosophers.⁵ The plural usage and indefinite article can help us to identify it. While that, otherwise, one of the criteria for distinguishing one first name that appoints an object is the usage of the definite article. The concept is essentially predicative, however, the usage that we do of language which is appointed an object does not have this predicate function. A concept can fall under other of second order; however, this does not finish with its predicative nature.

However, still is an Aristotle's distinction that the predicate can be *predicate of many*. The quality of some "*being white*" in a statement can be predicate of multiple particular "whites" because is a category; i.e., it is a form which the reality is structured. Thus, it is to apply to cats and horses: *the Frigola is white, Felix is white, Faisão is a white horse*.

Is it possible, however, to have any thought without a part of its elements, notably the element that has the function of object? Frege would answer that not; would be unsaturated, needing that the part corresponding to object be filled. Indeed, the own thought shows this impossibility. All and any theorization, the thought of the future or past evidence the need of terms that exercise determined functions. The terms need to be in proposition with determinate *extension* or, in case of name, as object. Not is possible to

⁵Although, we can affirm that the Frege's position about concept is "platonic", however, he introduces the concept as an unsaturated part of proposition. Concept, object and the invariable element composes the proposition.

understand about what is an universal before to understand what is Thought. We must to understand that there is symmetry between the language (that might be understood, of general way, as a public set and structured of meanings) and the Thought seen as not subjective, but a “property of many”.

To think a nominalism and that the words not has any meaning being merely words devoid content, to analyse, we must necessarily to ask: is it possible to think the own word that has been *thought* and that in moment determined (and other not) exercises a function of Metalanguage making possible the function of to think and analyse others words, however, in this moment, while *Thought*, without meaning? Would need, consequently, to employ another words (*verbus mentis* as would say scholastics) with full meaning for to think another words without meaning and so *ad infinitum*, because, otherwise, would violate the principle of non-contradiction⁶. It is as whether Thought⁷ permeated by language – or better, is reflecting that – were a substance separate, with concepts beyond space and time.⁸ But then, as to think the universals? Just is possible an answer: they compose the Thought (field of Philosophy and Metaphysics *par excellence*) and, consequently laws and theorization depends it. Common-sense and science pretend to do generalizations. What is the generalization if not thought? The theorization is a discourse, when we use of determined discourse and we intend the theory and prevision, not has sense to ask about universals at moment of the discourse, the quest is later, because we are already thinking by them when we are asking whether there are universals: the own question has “universal meaning.” That is, there are the thought about a “being” with recognizable attributes anywhere.

⁶ In fact, this principle does not concern to terms sensitively understood, but to thought: is an assertive way of to think still with all ambiguities that this word can carry.

⁷ The different positions in Philosophy of Logic among monists, pluralists, instrumentalists and of the status of Logic and of validity of different arguments on different logical systems are *nonsense*, because all and any logical discussions only is possible at language and in this point, we must to understand as definition of the language in an more general ambit: *all and any* language and idiom; all is *at Language in general*, i.e., are inside of an general ambit of public meaning; all and any *language* (this time deliberately with minuscule.) has meaning. The different idioms and languages are at *Language*; is only the *Language* while more general ambit and complex structure public of meaning becoming possible to think, that becomes possible the different idioms and Logic.

The Vienne Circle, under influence of the young Wittgenstein, become consensus statement that judgments of the Ethic, Metaphysics, Religion and Politics are *non-sense* because not has a reference. The Logic and Mathematics would be *non-sense*, however, not absurd. Certainly, is impossible to live without to do use of conjectures or prevision; various sciences such as Political Science, Economy and Natural Science does uses. We will think in a political example and verify the indispensability of the use of terms with broad *extension* and that are used as universals:

A) Imagine determined politic party of a fictitious country which, this party, has a Marxist political orientation which declares to defend workers. We will name of MPE – Marxist party of Eurasia; using of the name of the super-state in constant war in the George Orwell's book.

The political analysts and philosophers would can to do, naturally, the following previsions: the MPE is *a party that has a Marxist legend, then, probably, it will have a politics focused to workers*. We have here two orations which a subordinate oration is implicated by first oration, meaning universals concepts, such as: “it is a party that has a Marxist legend”; and at second “the workers” that also mean concepts and they are universals, i.e., the PME would to make a politics focused to *those* of a determined class which would fall under the concept of workers; the concept has determined characteristics and its members determined properties. The two propositions, that are a sensitive part, are compounds *of terms*; the not sensitive part concerns only to Thought, and this thought is property of many, compounds of concepts that enables to think the world in general and to do conjectures. All and any thought must to make this naturally. It is indispensable for own life and the “human live”. The Greeks did distinction between life of human permeated by language, the □□□□□□ and the natural life, the □□□□□□ Since the simple happening of the human relations to complex theorizations, the use of universals implicated by *world-picture* that we have is necessary.

Wittgenstein in book “*On Certainty*” speaks us that the *world-picture* is the “axis” which spin round the empirical judgments. In fact, the *world-picture* – we

can to generalize – guides also the perception and imagination that we have of things. We can imagine in two examples; one in world web and another example typical of science.

- 1) A boy who we will name x to want meet a girl y . The y girl to give a description to x of such and such way stating such and such attributes. The experience that x has of y and the idea of identity that x has concerns to y is an identity of linguistic level only of your descriptions; he does not know what is one thing oriented by this attributes described; x after met y ; x knows that the features of y is not equivalent to described, e.g., of that she would be blonde, i.e., y is not inside of the “blonde class”, not has the blonde feature. So, y is not blonde.

The question that follows, however, is that if the “Thing” - the blonde girl - would be untouched, not there is nothing in fact - excepting merely a linguistic definition and a way of arbitrary designation of the hair color, nevertheless, would belong only to “phenomena” - which characterizes all blonde women and remain to these phenomena; the hair color is an accidental element, would not be in same *status* of “humanity”, e.g., that feature the different blonde women. But the example is valid, because is indispensable the categorization inside of shared *world-picture*. *All and any previsions of events or behavior are done by categorization given to this beings thoughts, behaviors according the universals meanings by concepts that are predicates of many*. In case the concept to be empty, Frege speaks us that is little useful to science, but still can to be useful to literature. Frege thinks the concepts from a platonic theory, which they would be beyond space and time. Thus, Frege refutes the Mill’s empirical theory of numbers which they would be resulted of the sensation.

We will see a second example:

- 2) A scientist whose name is João researches about one class of mammals unexplored, which he still does not know to characterize.

However, along of research he discovers only that is a subspecies of *canis lupus* which will be characterize *canis lupus y*.

In above example for to become possible the classification was necessary resort to terms with shared meaning and that already mirrored a *world-picture* of science – the *world-picture* of scientist and of the *common-sense*.

The sense of a statement concerns to thought only; we do conjectures in quotidian without, however, worry us with your truth-value having only determinate shared *world-picture*. The theory, nevertheless, concerns to requirements of the science, is a generalization of laws, but no way prescind of universals; only these universals are recognized in stage of generalization, but subsisting since the hypothesis: it is union of universal united in hypothesis and that still concerns to Thought purely, and, therefore, is Metaphysical and the universal of theory – meaning a generalization -. has data of experience, i.e., there is a thought that, as remembers us Frege, is acknowledge as true. The critic that follows naturally is that the science belongs to a different field to *common-sense*, it shows more accuracy and a capacity of prevision different, and therefore, superior than we do daily. We will not do, however, a discussion deep about the “nature of science”; this problem will be research in other paper. Nevertheless, we need to have already in our mind now: the common-sense has a capacity of prevision inferior, because not has systematization and “method”; but, as speaks Bertrand Russell: “the science is a common-sense ‘enlightened’ (RUSSELL, B. apud MAIA, N F, 1990).

3. Conclusion

The Metaphysics belong to our spontaneous *world-picture*; we think by concepts with universal meaning through of a shared *world-picture*. The science also needs a *world-picture* for research. A scientist may to ask “if there are white geese”, but, will be little probable that he will ask: “what is a goose”? Asking he will be a metaphysical philosopher; he will need of a *world-picture* for reason and to research; because the language that is used for ask is “contaminated” of Metaphysics, because presuppose, when we speak: “that must touch the world”, although we not have no way to know whether this occurs verily; the

only confidence that we have is that there is a meaning, and this meaning, not mixture with the reference. The common-sense, analogous to science, also uses a shared *world-picture*, however, not have the same power of prevision and same accuracy.

Still, to think about future means that some attributes will be “contained” in the entities in the future; i.e., means that there are attributes which are shared in all objects of a class, because the entities that fall under the concept. When is thought about past, presuppose it that in the past the entities referenced had the same attributes.

I believe to have defended sufficiently what proposed in beginning of this article. In a next article, will be continued the theme of language as *world-picture*.

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